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Highlights 
 A fixed cost allocation model for a two-stage system is built 
 It is first work to apply efficiency invariance principle in two-stage system 
 Both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios are investigated 
 The former scenarios are based on overall efficiency invariance principle 
 The latter scenarios are based on divisional efficiency invariance principle 
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Fixed cost allocation among groups of entities is a prominent issue in numerous 
organisations. Addressing this issue has become one of the most important topics of 
the data envelopment analysis (DEA) methodology. In this study, we propose a fixed 
cost allocation approach for basic two-stage systems based on the principle of 
efficiency invariance and then extend it to general two-stage systems. Fixed cost 
allocation in cooperative and noncooperative scenarios are investigated to develop the 
related allocation plans for two-stage systems. The model of fixed cost allocation 
under the overall condition of efficiency invariance is first developed when the two 
stages have a cooperative relationship. Then, the model of fixed cost allocation under 
the divisional condition of efficiency invariance wherein the two stages have a 
noncooperative relationship is studied. Finally, the validation of the proposed 
approach is demonstrated by a real application of 24 nonlife insurance companies, in 
which a comparative analysis with other allocation approaches is included.  
Keywords: Data envelopment analysis, Fixed cost allocation, Cooperative model, 
Noncooperative model, Efficiency invariance principle 
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1. Introduction 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a mathematical programming approach that 
is used to evaluate the efficiency of groups of decision-making units (DMUs) with 
multiple inputs and outputs (Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes, 1978). It has been widely 
used in many fields, such as education, geoponics, healthcare and transportation 
(Emrouznejad and Yang, 2018). In recent years, DEA has also been applied to allocate 
fixed cost, because it can examine the effect of feasible allocation plans by the 
empirical description of the production possibility set based on the real productions 
(Beasley, 2003; Cook and Kress, 1999; Li, Yang, Liang, and Hua, 2009). The issue of 
fixed cost allocation is commonly encountered in real life when some agents (i.e. 
DMUs) use a common platform. An example provided by Cook and Zhu (2005) is the 
allocation of a manufacturer‟s advertising expenses to local retailers. Another example 
is the allocation of a bank‟s common television or newspaper advertising expenses to 
its branches. The crucial issue in fixed cost allocation is how to make an allocation 
plan for assigning cost to multiple DMUs.  
So far, many DEA works have focused on fixed cost allocation issues on the basis 
of efficiency invariance principle or efficiency maximization principle. It should be 
noted that the efficiency of a DMU here is relative efficiency by comparing with other 
DMUs. The principle of efficiency invariance refers to the invariance in the efficiency 
of DMUs before and after allocation. Cook and Kress (1999) firstly studied the issue 
of fixed cost allocation by using DEA. Their proposed allocation procedure solved 
linear programming problems on the basis of efficiency invariance principle and 
Pareto-minimality principle. In a subsequent work, Jahanshahloo, Lotfi, Shoja, and 
Sanei (2004) argued that Cook and Kress (1999)‟s method exists computational 
difficulties. Then they presented an approach that does not require the solution of 
linear programming problems but require some simple mathematical formulae to 
allocate the cost. Cook and Zhu (2005) pointed that Cook and Kress (1999)‟s 
approach cannot be used directly to determine cost allocation among DMUs although 
it can examine existing rules for equitable cost allocation. Thus, they modified Cook 
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and Kress (1999)‟s approach by providing a practical approach to the problem of cost 
allocation. Lin (2011a) proved that the method proposed by Cook and Zhu (2005) has 
no feasible solution under special constraints. To obtain a feasible allocation plan, Lin 
(2011a) improved Cook and Zhu (2005)‟s approach and set output targets in 
accordance with the amount of fixed cost shared by each DMU. Furthermore, Lin 
(2011b) proposed a DEA method for allocating cost and distributing common revenue 
among DMUs, which reflects the relative efficiency and the input-output scales of 
DMUs. More importantly, Lin and Chen (2016) illustrated that the “Pareto-minimality” 
introduced by Cook and Kress (1999) is inappropriate and then proposed a method 
based on super efficiency invariance and practical feasibility. Mostafaee (2013) 
presented an alternative allocation approach where the efficiency and the return to 
scale (RTS) of all DMUs remain unchanged after allocation. Lin, Chen, and Li (2016) 
proposed a method based on the principle of unit invariance to address the uniqueness 
of allocation plans successfully and allocate positive resources along with a positive 
target to each DMU. Amirteimoori and Kordrostami (2005) established a method 
based on a common set of weight and the efficiency invariance principle. However, 
Jahanshahloo, Sadeghi, and Khodabakhshi (2017) showed that the efficiency 
invariance principle is not necessarily satisfied when using Amirteimoori and 
Kordrostami (2005)‟s method. Hence, they presented two equitable approaches based 
on the efficiency invariance principle and a common set of weight principle.  
The principle of efficiency maximization indicates that the efficiency of all 
DMUs will be improved after cost allocation. Beasley (2003) firstly provided a cost 
allocation method based on this principle. Later, Si, Liang, Jia, Yang, Wu, and Li 
(2013) extended the work of Beasley (2003). They examined the equity of the 
proportional sharing method, and investigated the relationship between the extended 
method of proportional sharing and other DEA-based allocation methods. Li, Yang, 
Chen, Dai, and Liang (2013) utilised the DEA approach for equitable fixed cost 
allocation by considering the effect of allocation to each DMU. To identify a fair 
scheme, they introduced the concept of satisfaction degree and proposed a max-min 
model to generate a unique allocation plan. Du, Cook, Liang, and Zhu (2014) 
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established a cost allocation method on the basis of the cross-efficiency concept. 
Khodabakhshi and Aryavash (2014) proposed that the allocation must be directly 
proportional or inversely proportional to the inputs and the outputs. Lin and Chen 
(2017) introduced a global modified additive DEA (MAD) model to allocate fixed 
cost by optimizing the global MAD-efficiency. Li, Zhu, and Liang (2019) suggested 
that each DMU should propose an allocation plan to punish itself so as to guarantee 
the acceptability of the allocation plan. Considering the game relations in the 
allocation process, Li, Li, Emrouznejad, Liang, and Xie (2019) proposed a 
cooperative game allocation approach for cost allocation. To guarantee the uniqueness 
of the allocation result, Chu and Jiang (2019) defined the concept of utility of each 
DMU and obtained the cost allocation result by maximizing the minimum utility. 
According to the structure of the studied system, we mainly classify the fixed 
cost allocation studies into two categories. One category is cost allocation for 
single-stage systems, including the studies mentioned above. Although most studies 
on fixed cost allocation of single-stage system satisfy either efficiency maximization 
or efficiency invariance, several studies solve allocation issues from another way. For 
example, Yang and Zhang (2015) proposed a modified Shapley value to solve fixed 
cost allocation in single systems fairly, and they established a new Gini coefficient to 
evaluate the fairness of the allocation plan. To help managers incorporate different 
sub-objectives, Pendharkar (2018) utilised a hybrid genetic algorithm and DEA 
framework to solve the multicriterion issue of fixed cost allocation. Wu, Chu, and 
Liang (2016) considered that setting efficient targets by traditional allocation 
approaches is unfair to certain DMUs. Thus, they incorporated DEA and the closest 
target technique in the allocation problem. Some previous works based on efficiency 
maximization principle assumed that all DMUs become efficient after fixed cost 
allocation, such as Li, Yang, Chen, Dai, and Liang (2013). However, Ding, Chen, Wu, 
and Wei (2018) thought the achievement of a common technological level by all 
DMUs is impractical and thus presented a new approach that accounts for 
technological heterogeneity. Most of studies mentioned above regarded the fixed cost 
as a new input for the DMUs, but Li, Yang, Liang, and Hua (2009), Lin and Chen 
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(2017) allocated fixed cost as a complement of other cost inputs on the basis of DEA 
approach, and this method was extended to two-stage systems by Zhu, Zhang, and 
Wang (2019). Zhang, Wang, Qi, and Wu (2018) combined game theory and DEA 
approach to solve the problem of transmission cost allocation. Considering 
competitive and cooperative relationships among DMUs, Li, Zhu, and Liang (2018) 
integrated cooperative game theory and cross-efficiency method to develop a unique 
and fair allocation plan. Studies of this category ignored the internal structure of 
systems by considering them as „black boxes‟ (Yu, Chen, and Bo, 2016). 
Another category is fixed cost allocation for two-stage systems. Operational 
systems usually contain multiple stages. For example, banks usually contain deposit 
and lending processes. The substages of each bank branch use common facilities and 
thus each substage should be obliged to afford fixed cost allocation. So far, a few 
works have considered fixed cost allocation among two-stage systems. For instance, 
Yu, Chen, and Bo (2016) proposed an alternative approach to solve the problem of 
fixed cost allocation, which is based on two-stage DEA models and cross-efficiency 
concept. Ding, Zhu, Zhang, and Liang (2019) dealt with the fixed cost allocation 
problem for a general two-stage network structure, by introducing the concepts of 
satisfaction degree and fairness degree. Zhu, Zhang, and Wang (2019) treated the 
fixed cost as an additional input factor shared in two-stage DMUs and proposed three 
allocation procedures based on different objectives in reality. Chu, Wu, Chu, and 
Zhang (2019) considered the competition between the two stages of DMUs in fixed 
cost allocation issues and regarded all the first stages and all the second stages as two 
unions. Then the allocation plan is calculated by using satisfaction degree bargaining 
model. Considering internal structure, Li, Zhu, and Chen (2019) used DEA 
methodology to determine relative efficiency and allocated costs based on both 
common weights and operation size. To sum up, these works on fixed cost allocation 
in two-stage systems are based on the principle of efficiency maximization and 
neglect the possible relationship between the two stages. 
In this study, we focus on fixed cost allocation in two-stage systems, wherein 
potential conflicts between the two stages arise from intermediate measures (Liang, 
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Cook, and Zhu, 2008). In real life, there are many two-stage systems in government or 
business, and the fixed cost allocation issues commonly encountered when some 
agents (i.e. DMUs) use a common platform. Besides, the cooperation and competitive 
relationships between two stages may exist. Thus, in two-stage systems, assigning 
proper cost to each DMU and its substages considering the relationship between the 
two stages is a crucial problem. Assuming cooperative (or noncooperative) 
relationship between the two stages, we build a cooperative (or noncooperative) 
model for deciding how to allocate fixed cost in an equitable and fair way. The fair 
way means the relative efficiency of each DMU remains unchanged after allocation 
(Cook and Kress, 1999). Why do we keep efficiency invariant? We know that all 
DMUs‟ relative efficiency depends on existing inputs and outputs measures, which 
are out of control of other DMUs, hence the fixed cost allocation plan should be 
implemented based on the current efficiency scores (Li, Song, Dolgui, and Liang, 
2017; Cook and Kress, 1999). In addition, from operation‟s view, the given inputs and 
outputs adequately explain the production function, so the allocated cost should have 
no effect on this function (Cook and Kress, 1999). Therefore, the efficiency should be 
invariable after allocation in a short term.  
Compared with the previous works, the proposed approach in this paper has four 
main differences (some specific comparisons can be seen in Table 1). First, we build a 
DEA-based approach for fixed cost allocation in two-stage systems, which is based on 
the principle of efficiency invariance. Second, our approach studies both cooperative 
and noncooperative relationships between the two stages of systems during fixed cost 
allocation. The former relationship is investigated from a centralized point, whereas 
the latter one is studied from a competitive point. Third, our allocation plan is 
beneficial to the leader stage when the two stages are noncooperative. Furthermore, 
our approach makes the difference between the maximum allocation value and the 
minimum allocation value of DMUs smaller than that of other approaches, which is 
illustrated in our application. 
 
Table 1 
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Comparison among several previous methods and our method 
Authors Allocations 
principles 









of the one stage 
DEA 
Step 1: Assess the pre-allocation efficiency 
scores of each DMU and obtain the optimal 
intensity variables. 
Step 2: Allocate fixed cost by minimizing 
the gaps among allocated fixed costs based 
on the optimal values of intensive variables 
and the pre-allocation efficiency scores 
obtained from step 1. 











Step 1: Evaluating the efficiencies of all 
DMUs based on MAD model. 
Step 2: Allocate fixed cost by minimizing 
the difference between the maximum and 
minimum portions over the minimum fixed 












Step 1: Calculate the efficiency by additive 
two-stage models 
Step 2: Allocate fixed cost by maximizing 










Step 1: Determine the minimum and 
maximum and values of efficiency. 
Step 2: Calculate the share of DMU from 
step 1. 
Li, Li,   
Emrouznejad, 










Step 1: Define the characteristic function 
Step 2: Allocate the fixed cost based on 
nucleolus solution. 














Step 2: Put the new 𝐸 
  and 𝐸 
  into model 
to obtain next optimal solution until the 
values cannot further increase. 














Step 1: Consider two situations: (1) the 
lower bound of   and   (shared resource 
ratio of stage 1) are zero. (2) the lower 
bound of   and   are positive 
Step 2: Propose three procedures based on 
different objectives to obtain allocation 
plan. 
Li, Zhu, and Efficiency Two-stage Minimize the Step 1: Optimize the allocation plan by 
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considering the operation size. 
Step 2: Minimizing the maximal deviation 
repeatedly 












Step 1: Propose the leader-follower fixed 
cost allocation approach and the new 
concept of satisfaction degree. 
Step 2: Incorporate the Nash bargaining 
game theory to propose a satisfaction degree 
bargaining game model. 
















Step 1: Using the additive model and 
leader-follower model to get initial 
efficiency 
Step 2: Deduce efficiency invariance 
condition by models in step 1. 
Step 3: Allocate fixed cost in cooperative 
and noncooperative scenarios. 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The traditional DEA model and the 
fixed cost allocation approach proposed by Cook and Kress (1999) are briefly 
introduced in Section 2. The two-stage DEA models for measuring the efficiency of 
DMUs before and after allocation, and our fixed cost allocation models are presented 
in Section 3. Section 4 shows the validation of this approach by using a real 
application of 24 nonlife insurance companies. A comparative analysis with other 
allocation methods of two-stage systems is also given in this section. Section 5 
discusses the generalization of the proposed model to the general two-stage system. 
Conclusions and directions for future research are given in Section 6. 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1 Traditional DEA model 
Suppose that there are a set of homogeneous DMUs, and each 𝐷𝑀𝑈  (𝑗 =
1,… , 𝑛) uses I inputs 𝑥𝑖(𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼) to produce K outputs 𝑦𝑘(𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾). The 
output-oriented CCR (Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes, 1978) model is given as follows:  
Min ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖 
 
𝑖    (1) 
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𝑠 𝑡  ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖 
 
𝑖   ∑ 𝑢𝑘𝑦𝑘 
 
𝑘    , 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛  
 
 ∑ 𝑢𝑘𝑦𝑘 
 
𝑘  = 1  
 
 𝑣𝑖, 𝑢𝑘   , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼 𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾    
where 𝑢𝑘 is the weight appointed to the kth output, and 𝑣𝑖 is the weight appointed 
to the ith input. 𝑢𝑘, 𝑣𝑖 are variables in model (1). The dual of model (1) is as follows: 
Max     (2) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑    𝑥𝑖 
 
    𝑥𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼  
 
 
∑    𝑦𝑘 
 
      𝑦𝑘 , 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝐾  
 
      , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛   
where    and      are variables. 𝐷𝑀𝑈  is called an efficient DMU if and only 
if the optimal objective function value of models (1) and (2) equals one. Otherwise, it 
is called an efficient DMU. 
2.2 Fixed cost allocation method of Cook and Kress (1999) 
In this section, we briefly present the allocation method of Cook and Kress 
(1999), which can guarantee the efficiency of each DMU invariant after allocation.  
Before the fixed cost allocation, the efficiency of 𝐷𝑀𝑈  can be evaluated by 
model (1) or (2). After the allocation, we assume the allocated fixed cost to 𝐷𝑀𝑈  is 
𝑟 , 𝑗 = 1, …𝑛. Then, similar to the traditional DEA model (1), the efficiency of 𝐷𝑀𝑈  
after allocation can be measured by the following model in which the allocated fixed 
cost is considered as a new input. 
Min ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖 
 
𝑖   𝑣   𝑟   (3) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖 
 
𝑖   𝑣   𝑟  ∑ 𝑢𝑘𝑦𝑘 
 
𝑘    , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛.  
 
 ∑ 𝑢𝑘𝑦𝑘 
 
𝑘  = 1   
 𝑣𝑖, 𝑢𝑘   , 𝑣     , 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐾   
 
where 𝑣    is variable which represents the weight of the allocated fixed cost, 
𝑟 , 𝑗 = 1, …𝑛 are constant. Model (3) is a linear programming model. Considering the 
fact that a non-allocation plan is feasible through making 𝑣   =  , we let 𝑣     . 
Its dual programming model is as follows: 
Max   
′   (4) 
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𝑠 𝑡  ∑    𝑥𝑖 
 
    𝑥𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼  
 
 
∑    
 




′ 𝑦𝑘  ∑    𝑦𝑘 
 
     , 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐾  
 
      , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛   
It is important to know “how to set the allocated fixed cost to each DMU that can 
guarantee the efficiency invariable before and after allocation?” Cook and Kress 
(1999) proposed a principle called efficiency invariance principle which means the 
optimal objective function value of model (1) equals to the optimal objective function 
value of model (3) for 𝐷𝑀𝑈 . To realize the efficiency invariance principle, 𝑣    in 
model (3) must be out of the basis in the final simplex tableau (Jahanshahloo, Lotfi, 
Shoja, and Sanei, 2004). To better explain what is “out of the basis”, we give the 
following definition. 
Definition 1. For each 𝐷𝑀𝑈 , 𝑣    remains out of the basis means that the reduced 
cost is nonnegative. That is  
𝐶𝑣𝐼+1  𝑍𝑣𝐼+1   ⇒ 𝐶𝑣𝐼+1  𝐶𝐵𝐵
− 𝐴   ⇒ 𝑟  ∑    
∗ 𝑟 
 
       
⟹ 𝑟  ∑    
∗ 𝑟 
 
    (5) 
where    
∗ (𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛) are the optimal dual variables of model (3) (Cook and Kress, 
1999; Jahanshahloo, Lotfi, Shoja, and Sanei, 2004).  
To set the value of    and   
′  equal, the second constraint of model (4) must be 
redundant. That is,    
∗  in formula (5) must be the optimal solution of model (2). 
Therefore, 𝑟 , 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛  should satisfy 𝑟  ∑    
∗ 𝑟 
 
   . One limitation of this 
allocation is that it is not unique. If the overall fixed cost was distributed in its entirety 
among only inefficient DMUs in any proportion (Cook and Kress, 1999), the DEA 
efficiency scores would not change, and invariance assumption is satisfied. Hence, 
another condition, “the Input Pareto-Minimality” should be satisfied as well. The 
Input Pareto-Minimality is defined as follows: 
Definition 2. The Input Pareto-Minimality of fixed cost allocation plan means that no 
cost can be transferred from one DMU to another without violating the invariance 
         
 12 
principle (Cook and Kress, 1999). 
 In order to satisfy efficiency invariance and Input Pareto-Minimality principle, 
the constraint 𝑟 = ∑    
∗ 𝑟 
 
    should be satisfied for all inefficient 𝐷𝑀𝑈 . Denote 
𝑆  as the constraints in model (1) corresponding to the efficient reference set for 
𝐷𝑀𝑈 , we have 𝑟 = ∑    𝑟  ∈𝑆𝑑 , because other dual variables equal to zero 
according to complementary slackness. It should be noted that, Lin and Chen (2016) 
subsequently illustrated that this economic explanation “Pareto-Minimality” for the 
equality constraints is not appropriate and they suggested calling it as “practical 
feasibility assumption”. 
 
3. Proposed allocation model based on efficiency invariance in two-stage systems 
Considering the internal structure of each DMU, we propose a fixed cost 







Fig. 1. A basic two-stage system 
Fig. 1 depicts a two-stage network structure wherein outputs from the first stage 
become the inputs of the second stage. Suppose that we have n DMUs, and each 
𝐷𝑀𝑈 (𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛)  uses I nonnegative inputs 𝑥𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼)  to produce M 
intermediates 𝑧𝑚 (𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀). These intermediates are viewed as the inputs of the 
second stage to generate K outputs 𝑦𝑘 (𝑘 = 1,… ,𝐾). In this paper, analogous to 
Cook and Kress (1999), we regard the allocated fixed cost 𝑟  to each DMU as a new 
input. Let R denote the overall fixed cost of all DMUs, and 𝑟  denote the cost 
allocated to 𝐷𝑀𝑈 . The decision maker of each DMU can freely allocate the cost 
𝑦𝑘𝑗(𝑘 = 1,… ,𝐾) 𝑧𝑚𝑗(𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀) 
𝑥𝑖𝑗(𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼) 
𝛼𝑗𝑟𝑗  (1  𝛼𝑗)𝑟𝑗  
Stage 1 Stage 2 
𝑟𝑗 
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between Stages 1 and 2. 𝛼 𝑟  is the fixed cost allocated to the first stage of 𝐷𝑀𝑈 , 
whereas the rest of cost denoted by (1  𝛼 )𝑟  is allocated to the second stage of 
𝐷𝑀𝑈  (Chen, Du, Sherman, and Zhu, 2010; Yu, Chen, and Bo, 2016; Cook and 
Hababou, 2001). Chen, Du, Sherman, and Zhu (2010) stated that the value of 
𝛼 (  𝛼  1) is set within a range to balance allocation between the two stages. L 
and U are the lower bound and upper bound of 𝛼 , respectively. In reality, the value 
of L and U are determined by decision makers or branch consultant (Cook and 
Hababou, 2001) based on the actual economic bearing capacity of Stages 1 and 2. 
For each 𝐷𝑀𝑈  under the assumption of constant returns to scale (CRS), the 




∑      
 
  1
∑ 𝑣    
𝐼
  1  𝑣𝐼+1    
  (6) 
  
 =
∑      
 
  1
∑      
 
  1    +1( −  )  
  (7) 
3.1 Cooperative models for fixed cost allocation in two-stage systems 
In many cases, Stages 1 and 2 must work together to optimize overall 
performance. An alternative method to measure the efficiency of two-stage systems is 
to consider them from a centralized perspective and determine the set of the optimal 
weights of 𝑧𝑚. Chen, Du, Sherman, and Zhu (2010) set the overall efficiency by the 
weighted average of the two stages‟ efficiency scores as follows: 
 = 𝑝   
  𝑝   
   (8) 
𝑝  𝑝 = 1   
where 𝑝  and 𝑝  represent the relative importance of efficiency in the first and 
second stages, respectively. One way to identify the relative importance of each stage 
is the proportion of the overall inputs devoted to Stages 1 and 2. Considering the fixed 
cost, the concrete calculation formulae are as follows:  
𝑝 =
∑ 𝑣     𝑣𝐼+1    
𝐼
  1
∑ 𝑣     𝑣𝐼+1    
𝐼
  1  ∑      
 
  1    +1( −  )  
 and  
𝑝 =
∑      
 
  1    +1( −  )  
∑ 𝑣     𝑣𝐼+1    
𝐼
  1  ∑      
 
  1    +1( −  )  
.  
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The denominator represents the total inputs of 𝐷𝑀𝑈 , whereas ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖  𝑣   𝛼 𝑟 
 
𝑖   
represents the inputs of Stage 1, and ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑧𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚   𝑤𝑀  (1  𝛼 )𝑟  represents the 
inputs to Stage 2 (Chen, Du, Sherman, and Zhu, 2010). 
Thus, considering the fixed cost, the overall performance of two-stage DMU can 
be evaluated by solving the following model. The efficiency score of the two 
substages is simultaneously calculated by the optimal weights of model (9), 
Max 𝑝 
∑     𝑑
 
  1




∑     𝑑
 
  1
∑     𝑑
 
  1    +1( − 𝑑) 𝑑
= 𝐸   (9) 
𝑠 𝑡  
∑      
 
  1
∑ 𝑣     𝑣𝐼+1    
𝐼
  1
 1, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛  (9.1) 
 ∑      
 
  1
∑         +1( −  )  
 
  1
 1, 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛  (9.2) 
 𝑣𝑖, 𝑢𝑘, 𝑤𝑚   , 𝑣   , 𝑤𝑀     (9.3) 
 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼 𝑘 = 1,… ,𝐾 𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀   
where 𝑝 , 𝑝  represent the relative weights of efficiency in the first and second stages 
respectively. Constraints (9.1) and (9.2) show that the efficiency scores of Stages 1 
and 2 must not exceed 1. Putting 𝑝 , 𝑝  into model (9), and then it can be 
transformed into the following model: 
Max 
∑     𝑑
 
  1  ∑     𝑑
 
  1
∑ 𝑣   𝑑 𝑣𝐼+1 𝑑 𝑑
𝐼
  1  ∑     𝑑
 
  1    +1( − 𝑑) 𝑑
= 𝐸   (10) 
𝑠 𝑡  (9.1) - (9.3)  
Similar to Chen, Du, Sherman, and Zhu (2010) and Yu, Chen, and Bo (2016), we also 
assume that 𝑣   = 𝑤𝑀  = 𝜔 for all 𝐷𝑀𝑈 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛 in model (10), because the 
allocated cost 𝛼 𝑟  and (1  𝛼 )𝑟  are the same type of inputs. Then, by applying 
Charnes–Cooper transformation (Charnes and Cooper, 1962), 
let 𝜏 =
 
∑ 𝑣   𝑑
𝐼
  1  ∑   
 
  1   𝑑 𝜔 𝑑
, 𝑣𝑖
′ = 𝜏𝑣𝑖, 𝑤𝑚
′ = 𝜏𝑤𝑚 , 𝑢𝑘
′ = 𝜏𝑢𝑘, 𝜔
′ = 𝜏𝜔 , then 
model (10) is transformed into the following model, 
Max 𝑤𝑚
′ 𝑧𝑚  𝑢𝑘
′ 𝑦𝑘   (11) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑ 𝑤𝑚
′ 𝑧𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚   ∑ 𝑣𝑖
′ 
𝑖  𝑥𝑖  𝜔





𝑘  𝑦𝑘  ∑ 𝑤𝑚
′𝑀
𝑚  𝑧𝑚  𝜔
′(1  𝛼 )𝑟     
 





𝑖  𝑥𝑖  ∑ 𝑤𝑚
′𝑀
𝑚  𝑧𝑚  𝜔





′   ,𝜔′      
 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐾 𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛   
Model (11) is an input-oriented DEA model, similarly, we can obtained the following 
output-oriented DEA model: 
  1 𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∑ 𝑣𝑖
′ 
𝑖  𝑥𝑖  ∑ 𝑤𝑚
′𝑀




    (12) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑ 𝑤𝑚
′ 𝑧𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚   ∑ 𝑣𝑖
′ 
𝑖  𝑥𝑖  𝜔





𝑘  𝑦𝑘  ∑ 𝑤𝑚
′𝑀
𝑚  𝑧𝑚  𝜔





𝑚   ∑ 𝑢𝑘
′ 𝑦𝑘 
 





′   ,𝜔′      
 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐾 𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛   
The optimal overall efficiency after allocation is denoted by 𝑒 
𝑐𝑜∗, which is 
calculated by model LP1. Besides, the optimal efficiency of each stage after allocation 
is obtained by the optimal solutions (𝑣𝑖
′∗, 𝑤𝑚
′∗ , 𝑢𝑘
′∗, 𝜔′∗). The two divisional efficiency 
after allocation are denoted by 𝑒 
𝑐𝑜 ∗, 𝑒 
𝑐𝑜 ∗.  
Before fixed cost allocation, let 𝑟  equal zero for all 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛 in model (12), 
then we can obtain the initial overall efficiency and the initial divisional efficiency by 
solving model LP2. The initial overall efficiency and divisional efficiency are 
explained by Definition 3. 
    𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∑ 𝑣𝑖
′ 






     (13) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑ 𝑤𝑚
′ 𝑧𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚   ∑ 𝑣𝑖
′𝑥𝑖 
 






𝑘   ∑ 𝑤𝑚
′ 𝑧𝑚 
𝑀





𝑚   ∑ 𝑢𝑘
′ 





′      
 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐾 𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛   
Definition 3. The initial efficiency is defined as the efficiency before allocation. The 
initial overall efficiency (𝐸 
𝑐𝑜 , 𝐸 
 𝑜 ) is the efficiency of two-stage DMU before 
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allocation. The initial divisional efficiency is the efficiencies of two substages before 
allocation, and we denote the initial divisional efficiencies of two substages as 
𝐸 
𝑐𝑜 , 𝐸 
𝑐𝑜  and 𝐸 
 𝑜 , 𝐸 
 𝑜  in two scenarios, respectively. 
How to guarantee the efficiency before and after allocation invariant? Cook and 
Kress (1999) stated that a necessary condition for equitable allocation is that no DMU 
can use new input to improve its relative efficiency. Comparing LP1 and LP2, the 
overall efficiency invariance requires to maintain the variables 𝜔′ of LP1 out of the 
basis. However, achieving the allocation plan through models LP1 and LP2 is 
impossible. We can attempt to impose such a condition by duality theory. The 
respective dual models of LP1 and LP2 are 
DP1 Max     (14) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑ (   
     
  
   )𝑧𝑚  (1    )𝑧𝑚 ,𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀  (14.1) 
 
∑    
  
   𝑥𝑖  𝑥𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼  (14.2) 
 
∑    
  
   𝑦𝑘    𝑦𝑘 , 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐾  (14.3) 
 
∑ [   
 𝛼 𝑟     
 (1  𝛼 )𝑟 ]  𝑟 
 
     (14.4) 
 
   
 ,    
   , 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛  (14.5) 
 
DP2 Max     (15) 
𝑠 𝑡  (14.1) - (14.3)  
 (14.5)  
To satisfy the principle of efficiency invariance, the optimal value of DP1 and 
DP2 must be equal. Thus, constraint (14.4) in DP1 must be redundant. The optimal 
solution of DP1 must also be the optimal solution of DP2. Denote    
 ∗ ,    
 ∗ as the 
optimal variables of model DP2 when 𝐷𝑀𝑈  is evaluated, then we have 
∑ [   
 ∗𝛼 𝑟     
 ∗(1  𝛼 )𝑟 ]
 
    𝑟 . Evidently, this formula cannot determine 
equitable allocation sufficiently, and then the input practical feasibility principle is 
necessary. Therefore, the efficiency invariance condition becomes 
𝑟 = ∑ [   
 ∗𝛼 𝑟     
 ∗(1  𝛼 )𝑟 
 
   ]. We obtain the allocation plan by solving the 
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following model, 
Min |∑ 𝛼 𝑟  ∑ (𝑟  𝛼 𝑟 )
 
   
 
   |= obj1 (16) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑ [   
 ∗𝛼 𝑟     
 ∗(1  𝛼 )𝑟 
 




   =     
    𝛼  𝑈    
where    
 ∗,    
 ∗( = 1,… , 𝑛) are obtained by solving model DP2 n times. Model (16) 
is a nonlinear programming model because of ∑    
 ∗𝛼 𝑟 
 
    and ∑    
 ∗𝛼 𝑟 
 
    in 
certain constraints. In accordance with Chen, Du, Sherman, and Zhu (2010), we let 
𝑏 = 𝛼 𝑟 (𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛), model (16) can be converted into a linear programming model.  
Min |∑ 𝑏  ∑ (𝑟  𝑏 )
 
   
 
   |=obj1 (17) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑ [   
 ∗𝑏     
 ∗(𝑟  𝑏 )
 




   =     
   𝑟  𝑏      
  𝑈 𝑟  𝑏      
In cooperative scenario, decision makers should select one reasonable objective, 
which is similar to the approach of Cook and Zhu (2005). To minimize the deviation 
between Stage 1 and Stage 2, we let obj1 equal 𝑀𝑖𝑛 | ∑ 𝑏 
 
    ∑ (𝑟  𝑏 )
 
   |. The 
linear programming can be solved one time with an objective function obj1 to avoid 
the uniqueness. If there are still several optimal solutions, we can set a second 
objective function, for example, 𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∑ |𝑟  ?̅?|
 
   , 𝑀𝑖𝑛 
 
 
∑ (𝑟  ?̅?)
  
   , ?̅? =  𝑛⁄ . 
3.2 Noncooperative models for fixed cost allocation in two-stage systems 
The models presented in Section 3.1 are based on the cooperative relationship, 
wherein the two stages work together to obtain the optimal system result. In this 
section, we consider the noncooperative relationship between the two stages when the 
fixed cost is allocated to each DMU. Given such a competitive condition, we 
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introduce the Leader-Follower concept to explore the divisional efficiency invariance 
condition. Li, Chen, Liang, and Xie (2012) used the noncooperative approach 
developed by Liang, Cook, and Zhu (2008) to analyse this extended two-stage 
structure, they assumed one stage as the leader and another stage as the follower. The 
leader stage is more important than the follower stage. This leader–follower 
methodology is introduced from the Stackelberg game. For example, the existence of 
a manufacturer and retailer wherein the manufacturer plays a crucial part is called 
leader-follower competition or Stackelberg competition. 
Before fixed cost allocation, we should illustrate the noncooperative model in 
detail. Above all, the leader stage should be identified. Although Li, Chen, Cook, 
Zhang, and Zhu (2018) proposed an approach to uncover the leader stage of two-stage 
system, they assumed the leader stage of each DMU is unknown beforehand. 
However, here we assume the leader stage is known and identified based on expert 
opinions before allocation. In this paper, we assume that the leader is the first stage, 
and the follower is the second stage. Thus, the efficiency of Stage 2 is obtained when 
the leader‟s efficiency remains fixed. Certainly, Stage 2 can also be the leader if it is 
more important than Stage 1 in certain companies.  
The initial efficiency of the first stages of DMUs is obtained by solving model (1), 
here we rename model (1) as LP3. Let 𝑤𝑚
∗  and 𝑣𝑖
∗ be the optimal set of weights, 
and 𝐸 
 𝑜  is the initial efficiency of Stage 1 for 𝐷𝑀𝑈 . The intermediate product 
𝑧𝑚  is the only connection between Stages 1 and 2. Therefore, 𝐸 
 𝑜  should be 
introduced in the next model when the efficiency of the second stage is calculated. 
The optimal efficiency score of Stage 2 (follower) is calculated by maintaining Stage 
1‟s (leader) efficiency score. The model is as follows: 





     (18) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑ 𝑢𝑘𝑦𝑘  ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑧𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚    
 
𝑘  , 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛   
 
∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑧𝑚  ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖 
 
𝑖    
𝑀
𝑚  , 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛   
 ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑧𝑚  𝐸 
 𝑜 ∗ ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖 
 
𝑖  =  
𝑀
𝑚     
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 ∑ 𝑢𝑘𝑦𝑘 = 1
 
𝑘     
 𝑣𝑖, 𝑤𝑚 , 𝑢𝑘   ,𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼 𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾   
LP3 and LP4 represent the output oriented CCR (Charnes and Cooper, 1962) 
model. Once we obtain the efficiency of the first stage, the second stage can only 
consider variables 𝑤𝑚 that maintain 𝐸 
 𝑜 = 𝐸 
 𝑜 ∗ (Liang, Cook, and Zhu, 2008). 
Therefore, we consider ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑧𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚   as the single input to model LP3 that maintains 
the optimal objective value 𝐸 
 𝑜 ∗(Liang, Cook, and Zhu, 2008). 
In noncooperative scenario, we denote the overall optimal efficiency by 
𝐸 
 𝑜 ∗ ∗ 𝐸 
 𝑜 ∗. Using the same method as that used by Cook and Kress (1999), we set 
the condition of the efficiency invariance of Stage 1 as ∑    
∗ 
   𝛼 𝑟 = 𝛼 𝑟 , where 
   
∗  is the optimal variables of DP3 when 𝐷𝑀𝑈  is evaluated. 




  1∗  (19) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑    𝑧𝑖 
 
      
′ 𝑧𝑚    
 
∑    𝑥𝑖 
 
    𝑥𝑖    
    ,   
′   , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛 𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀   
Similarly, the condition of efficiency invariance for the second stage is as follows:  
∑ [𝜑  
∗ 
   (1  𝛼 )𝑟  𝛽  
∗ 𝛼 𝑟 ]  (1  𝛼 )𝑟 = 𝐸 
 𝑜 ∗𝜂  
∗ 𝛼 𝑟 , 𝜑  
∗ , 𝛽  
∗ , 𝜂  
∗  are 
the optimal variables of DP4.  
DP4 Max 𝜂  =
 
 𝑑
   ∗  (20) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑  𝜑  𝑦𝑘  𝜂  𝑦𝑘 
 
     , 𝑘 = 1,… , 𝐾   
 
∑ ((𝜑   𝛽  )𝑧𝑚 )  𝜂  𝑧𝑚 
 
    𝑧𝑚 ,𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀  
 
 
∑ 𝛽  𝑥𝑖 
 
    𝐸 
 𝑜 ∗𝜂  𝑥𝑖   , 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼   
 𝜑  , 𝛽       
Li, Yang, Chen, Dai, and Liang (2013) argued that each DMU is selfish to pay the 
minimum allocated cost. In the same way, leader stage (Stage 1) prefers to afford less 
cost than follower stage (Stage 2), so we set the objective function as 𝑜𝑏𝑗 =
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𝑀𝑖𝑛∑ 𝛼 𝑟 
 
   . Obviously, this objective function is non-linear, so we let 𝑏 =
𝛼 𝑟 , 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛, and then the allocation plan in the noncooperative scenario can be 
get by model (21). 𝜑  
∗ , 𝛽  
∗ , 𝜂  
∗ , 𝜂  
∗  are obtained by solving model DP4 n times.  
Min ∑ 𝑏 
 
   = 𝑜𝑏𝑗   (21) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑ 𝜑  
∗ 𝑟  𝑟  ∑ (𝛽  
∗  𝜑  
∗ )𝑏 
 
    𝐸 
 𝑜 ∗𝜂  
∗ 𝑏  𝑏 =  
 
      
 
∑    
∗ 




   =     
   𝑟  𝑏      
  𝑈 𝑟  𝑏      
Finally, decision makers should select one reasonable objective function obj2 
based on actual situations. If there are several optimal solutions, we can set a second 
objective function, for example, 𝑀𝑖𝑛 ∑ |𝑟   ̅|
 
   , 𝑀𝑖𝑛 
 
 
∑ (𝑟  ?̅?)
  
   , ?̅? = 𝑟 𝑛⁄ . 
4. Application to insurance companies 
Table 2 displays a dataset to illustrate our developed approach. The dataset 
consists of the operation data of 24 nonlife insurance companies in Taiwan, which 
was firstly shown in Kao and Hwang (2008). Nonlife insurance industries provide 
services to clients to obtain profit. The whole process of nonlife insurance service can 
be divided into two stages—premium acquisition and profit generation—to generate 
profit for insurance companies. The first stage is characterised by insurance services 
and the reception of direct written premiums from clients or reinsurance premiums. In 
the second stage, the acquired premiums are invested in a portfolio to generate profit 
and marketable securities, as well as real estate and mortgage loans. The system uses 
operation (𝑋 ) and insurance expenses (𝑋 ) to generate directly written (𝑍 ) and 
reinsurance premiums (𝑍 ). Then, such premiums are utilised to obtain underwriting 
(𝑌 ) and investment profits (𝑌 ).  
Suppose that the companies intend to build a common platform for information 
sharing by spending one million NT$. Problems may arise that how to allocate the 
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fixed cost allocation between two stages among different DMUs. Following the 
framework proposed in this study, we first calculate the efficiency score of Stages 1 
and 2 before fixed cost allocation through Chen‟s additive model (Chen, Du, Sherman, 
and Zhu, 2010) and Liang‟s (Liang, Cook, and Zhu, 2008) noncooperative model. 
After introducing fixed cost as a new input to each stage, we calculate the optimal 
dual solutions of models LP1, LP2, LP3 and LP4. Finally, we obtain the optimal 
results on the basis of efficiency invariance and practical feasibility principles. 
Table 2 





















1. Taiwan Fire 1178744 673512 7451757 856735 984143 681687 
2. Chung Kuo 1381822 1352755 10020274 1812894 1228502 834754 
3. Tai Ping 1177494 592790 4776548 560244 293613 658428 
4.China Mariners 601320 594259 3174851 371863 248709 177331 
5. Fubon 6699063 3531614 37392862 1753794 7851229 3925272 
6. Zurich 2627707 668363 9747908 952326 1713598 415058 
7. Taian 1942833 1443100 10685457 643412 2239593 439039 
8. Ming Tai 3789001 1873530 17267266 1134600 3899530 622868 
9. Central 1567746 950432 11473162 546337 1043778 264098 
10. The First 1303249 1298470 8210389 504528 1697941 554806 
11. Kuo Hua 1962448 672414 7222378 643178 1486014 18259 
12. Union 2592790 650952 9434406 1118489 1574191 909295 
13. Shingkong 2609941 1368802 13921464 811343 3609236 223047 
14.SouthChina 1396002 988888 7396396 465509 1401200 332283 
15. Cathay Century 2184944 651063 10422297 749893 3355197 555482 
16. Allianz President 1211716 415071 5606013 402881 854054 197947 
17. Newa 1453797 1085019 7695461 342489 3144484 371984 
18. AIU 757515 547997 3631484 995620 692731 163927 
19.North America 159422 182338 1141950 483291 519121 46857 
20. Federal 145442 53518 316829 131920 355624 26537 
21. Royal & Sun 
Alliance 
84171 26224 225888 40542 51950 6491 
22. Aisa 15993 10502 52063 14574 82141 4181 
23. AXA 54693 28408 245910 49864 0.1 18980 
24. Mitsui Sumitomo 163297 235094 476419 644816 142370 16976 
 
4.1 Scenario 1: Cooperative allocation models in two-stage systems 
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In this Scenario, we assume that all all stages of insurance companies cooperate 
to gain the maximum overall benefit. Thus, we use cooperative models to allocate 
fixed cost. Our proposed method consists of the following steps:  
Step 1: Use model LP2 to calculate the initial efficiency of Stage 1 (𝐸 
𝑐𝑜 ), Stage 2 
(𝐸 
𝑐𝑜 ) and the initial overall efficiency (𝐸 
𝑐𝑜) of 𝐷𝑀𝑈 . 
Step 2: Run model DP2 to obtain the optimal values of variables    
 ∗,    
 ∗, and then 
get the efficiency invariance condition.  
Step 3: Obtain the optimal value (𝑏 
∗, 𝛼 
∗) of model (17) by setting the objective 
function as 𝑀𝑖𝑛 |∑ 𝑏  ∑ (𝑟  𝑏 )
 
   
 
   |, 𝛼  is set between 0.3 and 0.7. 
Step 4: Introduce the value of 𝛼 , 𝑟  (j=1, …, n) into model LP1 to verify whether 
efficiency after cost allocation (𝑒 
𝑐𝑜 , 𝑒 
𝑐𝑜 , 𝑒 
𝑐𝑜)  is equal to the initial 
efficiency (𝐸 
𝑐𝑜 , 𝐸 
𝑐𝑜 , 𝐸 
𝑐𝑜) . The divisional efficiency after allocation is 
obtained by using the optimal solutions of model LP1. 
 
Table 3  
Fixed cost allocation plan in cooperative scenario 
 
Company 
Initial Efficiency Efficiency after allocation Allocation plan 
𝐸 
𝑐𝑜  𝐸 
𝑐𝑜  𝐸 
𝑐𝑜 𝑒 
𝑐𝑜  𝑒 
𝑐𝑜  𝑒 
𝑐𝑜 𝛼 𝑟  (1  𝛼 )𝑟   𝑟  
1. Taiwan Fire 0.9926 0.7045 0.8491 0.9926 0.7045 0.8491 2.5159 1.0783 3.5942 
2. Chung Kuo 0.9985 0.6257 0.8122 0.9985 0.6257 0.8122 3.1946 1.3691 4.5637 
3. Tai Ping 0.69 1 0.8166 0.69 1 0.8166 2.385 1.0221 3.4071 
4. China Mariners 0.7243 0.42 0.5965 0.7243 0.42 0.5965 1.1506 0.4932 1.6438 
5. Fubon 0.8307 0.9233 0.8727 0.8307 0.9233 0.8727 14.4907 6.2103 20.701 
6. Zurich 0.9606 0.4057 0.6887 0.9669 0.4083 0.6887 3.9185 1.6794 5.5979 
7. Taian 0.7521 0.3522 0.5804 0.674 0.4882 0.5804 3.7916 1.6249 5.4165 
8. Ming Tai 0.7256 0.378 0.5795 0.712 0.4268 0.5795 6.841 2.9318 9.7728 
9. Central 1 0.2233 0.6116 1 0.2681 0.6116 2.6039 1.116 3.7199 
10. The First 0.8615 0.5408 0.7131 0.8615 0.5409 0.7131 2.8153 1.2066 4.0219 
11. Kuo Hua 0.7292 0.2066 0.5088 0.7626 0.2169 0.5088 2.9536 1.2659 4.2195 
12. Union 1 0.7596 0.8798 1 0.7596 0.8798 4.2285 1.8122 6.0407 
13. Shingkong 0.8107 0.2431 0.5565 0.7989 0.3009 0.5565 4.6129 1.9769 6.5898 
14. South China 0.7246 0.374 0.5773 0.6548 0.4994 0.5773 2.708 1.1605 3.8685 
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15. Cathay Century 1 0.6138 0.8069 1 0.6361 0.8069 3.7676 1.6146 5.3822 
16. Allianz President 0.8856 0.3615 0.6395 0.9284 0.3786 0.6395 1.9797 0.8485 2.8282 
17. Newa 0.7232 0.4597 0.6126 0.5719 0.6568 0.6126 3.2305 1.3845 4.615 
18. AIU 0.7935 0.3262 0.5868 0.8113 0.3495 0.5868 1.5577 0.6676 2.2253 
19. North America 1 0.4112 0.7056 1 0.4112 0.7056 0.4317 0.1851 0.6168 
20. Federal 0.9332 0.5857 0.7654 0.8256 0.701 0.7654 0.2383 0.1021 0.3404 
21. Royal & Sun Alliance 0.7505 0.2623 0.5412 0.7505 0.2623 0.5412 0.1208 0.0518 0.1726 
22. Aisa 0.5895 1 0.7418 0.5895 1 0.7418 0.0416 0.0215 0.0631 
23. AXA 0.8426 0.4989 0.6854 0.8426 0.4989 0.6854 0.1027 0.044 0.1467 
24.Mitsui Sumitomo 1 0.087 0.5435 1 0.087 0.5435 0.3167 0.1357 0.4524 
 
Table 3 shows the results. The second column in Table 3 presents the efficiency 
value (obtained with Chen‟s additive model) of Stage 1 before allocation. The third 
column refers to the efficiency value of Stage 2, and the fourth column shows the 
overall efficiency calculated by model LP2 before allocation. The next three columns 
present efficiency after cost allocation. The last three columns are the fixed cost 
allocation plans for each substage and DMU. By comparing efficiencies before and 
after allocation, we find that the overall efficiency scores of all DMUs remain 
unchanged. This result is consistent with the principle of overall efficiency invariance. 
However, the divisional efficiency of certain DMUs, such as DMU6, DMU7, DMU8 
and DMU11, has changed. Therefore, our allocation model, which is based on the 
overall condition of efficiency invariance, cannot guarantee that divisional efficiency 
remains unchanged in the cooperative mode. 
The last three columns of Table 3 show that the maximum fixed cost is allocated 
to DMU5. The intermediate products and inputs of DMU5 far exceed those of others, 
thus additional input (fixed cost) is required to maintain the overall efficiency 
invariance. The above phenomenon can also be explained by the size of the input 
scale. According to the allocation plan to each substage, the allocated proportion to 
the first stage is approximately equal to 0.7. This value reaches the upper bound of 𝛼 
and satisfies the objective function obj1. Table 3 shows that DMU9 and DMU17 have 
approximately equal overall efficiency, but the inputs of DMU17 are slightly more 
than that of DMU9, thus DMU17 requires additional fixed cost. Compared with 
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DMU21, the intermediates of DMU23 are more than DMU21. It is supposed that the 
second stage of DMU23 affords many fixed cost, while the results show that the 
second stage of DMU21 (0.0518) bears more cost than DMU23 (0.044). This is due to 
the value of 𝐸 
𝑐𝑜  for DMU21 is lower than DMU23. The DMU with low efficiency 
requires many cost to ensure its efficiency invariant. 
4.2 Scenario 2: Noncooperative allocation model in two-stage systems 
In the proposed framework, we assume that both stages seek to maximize 
personal interest. Thus, we use the noncooperative model to allocate fixed cost. The 
allocation plan is obtained as follows: 
Step 1: Use models LP3 and LP4 to calculate the initial efficiency of Stage 1 (𝐸 
 𝑜 ) 
and Stage 2 (𝐸 
 𝑜 ). 
Step 2:Run models DP3 and DP4 to obtain the optimal dual variables 
   
∗ , 𝜑  
∗ , 𝛽  
∗ , 𝜂  
∗ , 𝜂  
∗ ( = 1,… , 𝑛)  and determine efficiency invariance 
conditions. 
Step 3: Let   =   1 and 𝑈 =   7, and use model (21) to obtain the fixed cost 
allocation of each stage. 
Step 4: Use the value of 𝛼 , 𝑟  (𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛) to verify whether efficiency after cost 
allocation (𝑒 
𝑐𝑜 , 𝑒 
𝑐𝑜 , 𝑒 
𝑐𝑜) is equal to the initial efficiency (𝐸 
𝑐𝑜 , 𝐸 
𝑐𝑜 , 𝐸 
𝑐𝑜). 
Table 4 shows the allocation plan for the two-stage network systems and the 
efficiency of each stage. 
 
Table 4 
Fixed cost allocation plan in noncooperative scenario 
 
Company 
Initial Efficiency  Efficiency after allocation Allocation plan 
𝐸 
 𝑜  𝐸 
 𝑜  𝐸 
 𝑜 𝑒 
 𝑜  𝑒 
 𝑜  𝑒 
 𝑜 𝛼 𝑟  (1  𝛼 )𝑟  𝑟  
1. Taiwan Fire 0.9926 0.7045 0.6993  0.9926 0.7045 0.6993  0.5041 3.5244 4.0285 
2. Chung Kuo 0.9985 0.6257 0.6248  0.9985 0.6257 0.6248  0.8366 4.7874 5.624 
3. Tai Ping 0.69 1 0.6900  0.69 1 0.6900  0.4422 2.2849 2.7271 
4. China Mariners 0.7243 0.42 0.3042  0.7243 0.42 0.3042  0.3201 1.5414 1.8615 
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5. Fubon 0.8375 0.8057 0.6748  0.8375 0.8057 0.6748  2.6241 15.9881 18.6122 
6. Zurich 0.9637 0.401 0.3864  0.9637 0.401 0.3864  0.5003 4.2763 4.7766 
7. Taian 0.7521 0.3522 0.2649  0.7521 0.3522 0.2649  0.9068 5.5153 6.4221 
8. Ming Tai 0.7256 0.378 0.2743  0.7256 0.378 0.2743  1.3909 7.3714 8.7623 
9. Central 1 0.2233 0.2233  1 0.2233 0.2233  0.7088 4.8224 5.5312 
10. The First 0.8615 0.5408 0.4659  0.8615 0.5408 0.4659  0.6101 4.1372 4.7473 
11. Kuo Hua 0.7405 0.1675 0.1240  0.7405 0.1675 0.1240  0.4931 3.0602 3.5533 
12. Union 1 0.7596 0.7596  1 0.7596 0.7596  0.4977 4.4789 4.9766 
13. Shingkong 0.8107 0.2431 0.1971  0.8107 0.2431 0.1971  1.0175 5.6744 6.6919 
14. South China 0.7246 0.374 0.2710  0.7246 0.374 0.2710  0.6559 3.7778 4.4337 
15. Cathay Century 1 0.6138 0.6138  1 0.6138 0.6138  0.4732 4.2584 4.7316 
16. Allianz President 0.9072 0.3356 0.3045  0.9072 0.3356 0.3045  0.3038 2.4412 2.745 
17. Newa 0.7233 0.4555 0.3295  0.7233 0.4555 0.3295  0.6573 4.1114 4.7687 
18. AIU 0.7935 0.3262 0.2588  0.7935 0.3262 0.2588  0.4159 2.0684 2.4843 
19. North America 1 0.4112 0.4112  1 0.4112 0.4112  0.14 0.5685 0.7085 
20. Federal 0.9332 0.5857 0.5466  0.9332 0.5857 0.5466  0.0411 0.2633 0.3044 
21. Royal & Sun Alliance 0.7505 0.2623 0.1969  0.7505 0.2623 0.1969  0.0201 0.1234 0.1435 
22. Aisa 0.5895 1 0.5895  0.5895 1 0.5895  0.008 0.0283 0.0363 
23. AXA 0.8501 0.4512 0.3836  0.8501 0.4512 0.3836  0.0214 0.1452 0.1666 
24. Mitsui Sumitomo 1 0.087 0.0870  1 0.087 0.0870  0.1163 1.0467 1.163 
 
The second to fifth columns in Table 4 present the initial efficiency value 
(obtained by Liang‟s (Liang, Cook, and Zhu, 2008) noncooperative model) of 
two-stage systems, respectively. The next three columns present the efficiency after 
cost allocation. The last three columns are the fixed cost allocation plan of each stage 
for DMUs. By comparing efficiencies before and after allocation, we find that the 
efficiency scores of Stages 1 and 2 remain unchanged, which satisfies the principle of 
divisional efficiency invariance. According to the allocation plan to each stage, we 
also know that the cost allocated to leader is less than follower. 
The last three columns of Table 4 show that the highest fixed cost is allocated to 
DMU5 because fixed cost allocation is related to input size. The allocation plan for 
each substages shows that the allocating proportion to the first stage fluctuates 
between lower bound and upper bound. This is because the objective of the allocation 
model is to minimize the sum of allocation to Stage 1 of all DMUs, not minimize the 
allocation to Stage 1 of each DMU. Table 4 shows that DMU8 and DMU14 have 
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similar divisional efficiency, while DMU8 could afford additional fixed cost 
allocation because it consumes more expenses than DMU14.  
 
4.3 Comparison  
Comparison results of different scenarios 
 In reality, cooperative and noncooperative relationship among units are general. 
Different relationships may have different consequences for companies. Hence, 
explaining the differences and the significances of different relationships for real life 
environments is necessary.  
First, the results show that all the overall efficiency of DMUs with a cooperative 
relationship are higher than those of DMUs with a noncooperative relationship. This 
feature verifies the view of win-win cooperation. If substages compete with each other, 
the overall performance of DMU will decrease. For example, if Stage 1 and Stage 2 
are equally important, the decision maker should choose a cooperative working mode 
to improve company‟s overall performance. Second, the results show that allocation 
plan of noncooperative model benefits the leader, because it affords less cost than 
follower. This illustrates, from a personal point of view, the dominant party gains 
more in real life. Decision makers can adopt this strategy when a department (Leader 
stage) has strong profitability. Third, the value of 𝛼  is different. The 𝛼  of each 
DMU achieves the upper bound 𝑈  in a cooperative relationship, but it is diverse in a 
noncooperative relationship. The most likely explanation for these results is the 
different invariance principles. One is based on the principles of overall efficiency 
invariance, and the other one is based on the principle of divisional efficiency 
invariance. This phenomenon shows that, in cooperative scenarios, the allocation 
proportion to substage is related to    and 𝑈 , so the decision makers should choose 
   and 𝑈  carefully. In noncooperative scenarios, the leader stage is unwilling to 
bear many fixed cost, so decision makers should determine the value of    by the 
reality of leader stage.  
Comparison with Lin (2011a) 
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 The proposed method is based on efficiency invariance principle, which is 
defined by Cook and Kress (1999). Some other researchers also extend Cook and 
Kress (1999)‟s method, such as Lin (2011a). However, there are some distinctions.  
First, Lin (2011a) proposed methods for allocating fixed cost or resources among 
DMUs, which ignored the internal structures of DMUs. However, the approach of this 
paper aims at allocating fixed cost to two-stage network systems, and the relationship 
between the two stages is considered. Second, the allocation approach of Lin (2011a) 
is based on efficiency invariance principle, which didn‟t adopt practical feasibility 
assumption. Thus, the approach of Lin (2011a) is more flexible when several other 
constraints are added, and then the allocation plan can be obtained according to the 
reality of enterprises. However, in this paper, the enterprises‟ allocation plan can be 
changed by transforming the objective function of model. Third, Lin (2011a) 
combined the allocation approach with output targets setting. His approach can solve 
the problem of how to set targets among all DMUs appropriately. 
Comparison with existing methods 
 To show the usefulness of the proposed approach over the current allocation 
approaches, we provide a comparative study here. As far as we know, Yu, Chen, and 
Bo (2016), Zhu, Zhang, and Wang (2019), Chu, Wu, Chu, and Zhang (2019), Li, Zhu, 
and Chen (2019), Ding, Zhu, Zhang, and Liang (2019) studied fixed cost allocation 
issues of two-stage network structure. Although Zhu, Zhang, and Wang (2019) studied 
fixed cost and shared resources allocation in two-stage network system, they put more 
focus on shared resource allocation rather than fixed cost allocation, thus their study is 
not comparable to our method. Therefore, here we compare the result with Yu, Chen, 
and Bo (2016), Chu, Wu, Chu, and Zhang (2019), Li, Zhu, and Chen (2019), Ding, 






Cooperative model (17) Noncooperative model (21) Li, Zhu and Chen (2019) 
Stage 1 Stage 2 System Stage 1 Stage 2 System Stage 1 Stage 2 System 
1. Taiwan Fire 2.5159 1.0783 3.5942 0.5041 3.5244 4.0285 1.2163 3.8033 5.0196 
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2. Chung Kuo 3.1946 1.3691 4.5637 0.8366 4.7874 5.624 1.6337 4.4202 6.0539 
3. Tai Ping 2.385 1.0221 3.4071 0.4422 2.2849 2.7271 0.5207 3.523 4.0437 
4. China Mariners 1.1506 0.4932 1.6438 0.3201 1.5414 1.8615 0.3798 0.6475 1.0272 
5. Fubon 14.491 6.2103 20.701 2.6241 15.9881 18.6122 5.5688 26.1447 31.7135 
6. Zurich 3.9185 1.6794 5.5979 0.5003 4.2763 4.7766 1.0983 2.2795 3.3778 
7. Taian 3.7916 1.6249 5.4165 0.9068 5.5153 6.4221 1.457 2.8466 4.3037 
8. Ming Tai 6.841 2.9318 9.7728 1.3909 7.3714 8.7623 2.1627 4.3533 6.516 
9. Central 2.6039 1.116 3.7199 0.7088 4.8224 5.5312 1.9935 0 1.9935 
10. The First 2.8153 1.2066 4.0219 0.6101 4.1372 4.7473 1.1608 3.6289 4.7897 
11. Kuo Hua 2.9536 1.2659 4.2195 0.4931 3.0602 3.5533 0.7525 0 0.7525 
12. Union 4.2285 1.8122 6.0407 0.4977 4.4789 4.9766 1.0442 5.5269 6.5711 
13. Shingkong 4.6129 1.9769 6.5898 1.0175 5.6744 6.6919 2.0051 2.1947 4.1998 
14. South China 2.708 1.1605 3.8685 0.6559 3.7778 4.4337 0.9864 1.9797 2.966 
15.Cathay Century 3.7676 1.6146 5.3822 0.4732 4.2584 4.7316 1.4978 5.0607 6.5585 
16. Allianz President 1.9797 0.8485 2.8282 0.3038 2.4412 2.745 0.7685 0.8805 1.649 
17. Newa 3.2305 1.3845 4.615 0.6573 4.1114 4.7687 1.0041 4.3006 5.3047 
18. AIU 1.5577 0.6676 2.2253 0.4159 2.0684 2.4843 0.4585 0.9545 1.413 
19. North America 0.4317 0.1851 0.6168 0.14 0.5685 0.7085 0.1874 0.6297 0.8171 
20. Federal 0.2383 0.1021 0.3404 0.0411 0.2633 0.3044 0 0.5245 0.5245 
21. Royal & Sun Alliance 0.1208 0.0518 0.1726 0.0201 0.1234 0.1435 0.0113 0.0459 0.0572 
22. Aisa 0.0416 0.0215 0.0631 0.008 0.0283 0.0363 0.0032 0.1142 0.1174 
23. AXA 0.1027 0.044 0.1467 0.0214 0.1452 0.1666 0.0312 0.0613 0.0925 
24. Mitsui Sumitomo 0.3167 0.1357 0.4524 0.1163 1.0467 1.163 0 0.1382 0.1382 
SUM 69.9977 30.0026 100 13.7053 86.2947 100 25.9418 74.0584 100 
 




Yu, Chen, and Bo (2016) 
Ding, Zhu, Zhang and 
Liang (2019) 
Chu, Wu, Chu, and Zhang 
(2019) 
Stage 1 Stage 2 System Stage 1 Stage 2 System Stage 1 Stage 2 System 
1. Taiwan Fire 1.9945 2.7965 4.7910 1.0368 4.1421 5.1789 0.8367 2.2865 3.1233 
2. Chung Kuo 2.9312 2.9464 5.8776 1.228 4.6304 5.8584 1.1251 2.7501 3.8752 
3. Tai Ping 1.2725 2.9202 4.1927 0.2945 3.8431 4.1376 0.5363 1.0575 1.5938 
4. China Mariners 0.8468 0.3838 1.2306 0.0775 0.682 0.7595 0.3565 0.4402 0.7967 
5. Fubon 9.0287 20.0117 29.0404 3.9046 29.3284 33.2330 4.1987 18.5168 22.7155 
6. Zurich 2.5250 1.0977 3.6227 0.9937 2.4917 3.4854 1.0946 3.2208 4.3153 
7. Taian 2.6280 1.4853 4.1133 0.6955 3.2289 3.9244 1.1998 4.2896 5.4894 
8. Ming Tai 4.2745 2.0199 6.2944 1.3076 4.9285 6.2361 1.9389 7.4133 9.3521 
9. Central 2.7848 1.1935 3.9783 1.5773 0.0845 1.6618 1.2883 1.3567 2.6449 
10. The First 2.0249 2.4530 4.4779 0.4343 4.0724 4.5067 0.9219 3.5628 4.4847 
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11. Kuo Hua 1.8449 0.7907 2.6355 0.5269 0 0.5269 0.8110 2.4341 3.2451 
12. Union 2.5173 4.0280 6.5453 0.9917 6.0322 7.0239 1.0594 3.6730 4.7324 
13. Shingkong 3.4179 1.4648 4.8827 1.3882 2.5584 3.9466 1.5632 6.5785 8.1417 
14. South China 1.8258 1.0955 2.9212 0.4727 2.2359 2.7086 0.8305 2.6878 3.5183 
15.Cathay Century 2.6118 2.9571 5.5689 1.3547 5.6778 7.0325 1.1703 6.9049 8.0751 
16.Allianz President 1.4033 0.6014 2.0047 0.6436 0.9902 1.6338 0.6295 1.5083 2.1378 
17. Newa 1.8455 2.4714 4.3169 0.3909 4.889 5.2799 0.8641 6.4877 7.3518 
18. AIU 1.1841 0.5075 1.6916 0.3601 0.8822 1.2423 0.4078 1.3311 1.7389 
19. North America 0.4383 0.1895 0.6278 0.1921 0.6069 0.7990 0.1282 1.0643 1.1925 
20. Federal 0.1190 0.2758 0.3948 0 0.5618 0.5618 0.0356 0.7733 0.8089 
21. Royal & Sun Alliance 0.0649 0.0278 0.0927 0.006 0.0457 0.0517 0.0254 0.0966 0.1220 
22. Aisa 0.0268 0.0626 0.0894 0 0.1258 0.1258 0.0058 0.1781 0.1840 
23. AXA 0.0736 0.0411 0.1147 0.0265 0.0592 0.0857 0.0276 0.0000 0.0276 
24.Mitsui Sumitomo 0.3465 0.1485 0.4950 0 0 0.0000 0.0535 0.2796 0.3331 
SUM 48.0306 51.9697 100 17.9032 82.0971 100 21.1087 78.8916 100 
 
It is obvious that these approaches generate different results due to the research 
perspectives and efficiency principles. Li, Zhu, and Chen (2019) allocated the fixed 
cost by considering the operation size and the principle of efficiency maximization. 
Yu, Chen, and Bo (2016) introduced the concept of cross-efficiency to allocate the 
fixed cost. Ding, Zhu, Zhang, and Liang (2019) used the concept of satisfaction 
degree and Chu, Wu, Chu, and Zhang (2019) considered the competition between the 
DMUs‟ two stages. These approaches are all based on efficiency maximization 
principle, while our approach keep the efficiency invariant.  
Based on the results of Table 5, we have some findings. First, it is clearly 
observed that the maximal cost is allocated to the DMU 5, who has large operation 
size, this suggests that the allocation plan is highly related with operation size in 
different scenarios. Second, the allocation cost to all stages by Yu, Chen, and Bo 
(2016) and ours are all positive, while in other methods‟ results several substages are 
allocated zero cost because these methods do not have the limits on allocation 
proportion. Third, we find that the allocation plan of Li, Zhu, and Chen (2019) and 
Ding, Zhu, Zhang, and Liang (2019) have a larger fluctuation than other approaches. 
Specifically, the differences between maximum and minimum cost allocated to DMUs 
by our approach are 20.6379 (cooperative) and 18.5759 (noncooperative), while those 
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of others are bigger than ours. Finally, in noncooperative scenarios, our allocation 
plan is beneficial to leader stage. It can be seen from the fifth column where the 
allocation amount of Stages 1 is less than other allocation plan, and the sum of 
allocation to Stage 1 is the least.  
To better compare these allocation schemes, we show the system allocation 
results in the following bar chart. According to Fig. 2, we find that the distribution 
trend among DMUs is similar, that is to say, the allocation results generated by ours 
and other approaches are very closely related. However, there are differences in some 
cases. For example, Fig. 2 shows that the allocation amount of DMU5 calculated by 
our approach is less than that of other approaches (Chu, Wu, Chu, and Zhang, 2019; 
Ding, Zhu, Zhang, and Liang, 2019; Li, Zhu, and Chen, 2019; Yu, Chen, and Bo, 
2016), while the allocation amount of DMU4 (or DMU6, DMU11, DMU14, DMU21) 
calculated by our approach is more than that of other approaches. This is because of 
the different efficiency principle. Compared with allocation plan based on efficiency 
maximization principle (Chu, Wu, Chu, and Zhang, 2019; Ding, Zhu, Zhang, and 
Liang, 2019; Li, Zhu, and Chen, 2019; Yu, Chen, and Bo, 2016), in this research, 
DMUs with small operation size and low efficiency afford much cost to keep 
efficiency invariant. Inversely, DMUs with large operation size and high efficiency 
afford less cost than Chu, Wu, Chu, and Zhang (2019), Ding, Zhu, Zhang, and Liang 
(2019), Li, Zhu, and Chen (2019), Yu, Chen, and Bo (2016). 
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Fig. 2. Comparisons of allocation plan 
 
5. Discussion and generalization 
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 As mentioned before, the proposed approach for fixed cost allocation applies to 
basic two-stage systems. Here we extend it to general two-stage systems using the 
same method. As shown in Fig. 3, the structure of general two-stage system is 
characterized by the exogenous output (𝑦
𝜉𝑗
1 , 𝜉 = 1, … , 𝜙) of Stage 1 and exogenous 
input (𝑥𝑞𝑗
 , 𝑞 = 1, … , 𝑄) of Stage 2. Stage 1 produces exogenous and endogenous 
outputs. By contrast, Stage 2 uses endogenous outputs from Stage 1 and exogenous 





Fig. 3. General two-stage system 
For DMUs with general two-stage systems, the related procedures of fixed cost 
allocation on the basis of efficiency invariance principle in two different scenarios are 
presented as follows. 
Procedure. First, we should explore the efficiency invariance condition in 
cooperative scenarios. The efficiency of each stage considering fixed cost allocation is 
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By adopting a unified approach similar to Chen, Du, Sherman, and Zhu (2010), 
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Let 𝑣   = 𝑤𝑀  = 𝜔, then apply Charnes–Cooper transformation and denote 
𝑥𝑞𝑗
 ,𝑞 = 1,… ,𝑄 
𝑦𝜉𝑗
 , 𝜉 = 1,… ,𝜙 
𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼 
 
𝑦𝑘𝑗
 ,𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾 𝑧𝑚𝑗 ,𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀 
𝛼𝑗𝑟𝑗  (1  𝛼𝑗)𝑟𝑗 
Stage 1 Stage 2 
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𝜋 = 1 (∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖 
  
𝑖   ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑧𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚   ∑ ℎ𝑞𝑥𝑞 
 𝑄
𝑞   𝜔𝑟 )⁄ , 𝑣𝑖
′ = π𝑣𝑖 , 𝑤𝑚
′ = π𝑤𝑚 , 
𝜔′ = 𝜋𝜔, 𝑢𝑘
′ = π𝑢𝑘 , 𝑡𝜉
′ = π𝑡𝜉 , ℎ𝑞
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   (24) 
The optimal value of 𝑒 
 𝑐𝑜
 can be calculated by the following output-oriented 
model. 
LPG1 Min ∑ 𝑣𝑖
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′   ,𝜔′   , 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛   
 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼 𝑚 = 1, … ,𝑀 𝜉 = 1,… ,𝜙 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾 𝑞 = 1,… ,𝑄   
The dual model of LPG1 is as follows: 
DPG1 Max    (26) 
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By using the same method as that used by Cook and Kress (1999), the overall 
condition of efficiency invariance is ∑ [   
 ∗𝛼 𝑟     
 ∗(1  𝛼 )𝑟 ] = 𝑟 
 
   ,    
 ∗,    
 ∗ 
represents the optimal variable of model (27). 
Max   
′   (27) 
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   , 𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀   
 
∑     
 𝑦𝜉 
    𝑦𝜉 
       , 𝜉 = 1,… , 𝜙    
 
∑     
 𝑦𝑘 
    
′ 𝑦𝑘 
       , 𝑘 = 1, … ,𝐾   
 
   
 ,    
   , 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛    
Second, the condition of efficiency invariance in noncooperative scenarios can be 
derived by the same way. The following models refer to the divisional efficiency of 
each stage after allocation. 
Leader Stage 
Min ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖 
  




   1  (28) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑧𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚   ∑ 𝑡𝜉𝑦𝜉 
  
𝜉   ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖 
  




𝑚   ∑ 𝑡𝜉𝑦𝜉 
  
𝜉  = 1   
 
𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛, 𝑤𝑚 , 𝑣𝑖, 𝑡𝜉   ,𝜔    
    
 
 
𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼 𝜉 = 1,… ,𝜙   
Follower Stage  
Min ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑧𝑚  ∑ ℎ𝑞𝑥𝑞 
 𝑄




    
𝑀
𝑚    (29) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑧𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚   ∑ 𝑡𝜉𝑦𝜉 
  
𝜉   ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖 
  
𝑖   𝜔𝛼 𝑟      
 
∑ 𝑢𝑘𝑦𝑘 
  ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑧𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚   ∑ ℎ𝑞𝑥𝑞 
 𝑄
𝑞   𝜔(1  𝛼 )𝑟   
 




𝜉   ∑ 𝑤𝑚𝑧𝑚 
𝑀
𝑚   𝑒 
  𝑜 ∗(∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑖 
  
𝑖   𝜔𝛼 𝑟 ) =    





𝑘  = 1   
 
𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛, 𝑣𝑖, 𝑡𝜉 , 𝑤𝑚 , ℎ𝑞, 𝑢𝑘   ,𝜔      
 
𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼 𝜉 = 1,… ,𝜙 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾 𝑞 = 1,… ,𝑄  
To satisfy the principle of efficiency invariance, the following formula must be 
established ∑    
∗ 𝛼 𝑟 
 
   = 𝛼 𝑟 , ∑ [𝜑  
∗ (1  𝛼 )𝑟  𝛽  
∗ 𝛼 𝑟 ]  (1  𝛼 )𝑟  
 
   
         
 35 
𝐸 
  𝑜 ∗
𝜂  
∗ 𝛼 𝑟 =  .    
∗  is the optimal variable of model (30) when 𝐷𝑀𝑈  is 
evaluated, and 𝜑  
∗ , 𝛽  
∗ , 𝜂  
∗  are calculated by model (31). 𝐸 
  𝑜 ∗
, 𝐸 
  𝑜 ∗
 represents 
the efficiency of two substages. 





   1  (30) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑    𝑧𝑚    
′ 𝑧𝑚 
 
       
 
∑    𝑦𝜉 
    
′ 𝑦𝜉 
  
      
 
∑    𝑥𝑖 
  𝑥𝑖 
  
      
    ,   
′      
 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑛 𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀  𝜉 = 1,   , 𝜙   
 




      (31) 
𝑠 𝑡  ∑  𝜑  𝑦𝑘 
  𝜂  𝑦𝑘 
       , 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾    
 
∑  𝛽  𝑦𝜉 
  𝜂  𝑦𝜉 
  
     , 𝜉 = 1,… , 𝜙   
 
∑ (𝜑   𝛽  )𝑧𝑚  𝜂  𝑧𝑚  𝑧𝑚 ,
 
   𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀   
 
∑ 𝛽  𝑥𝑖 
  
    𝐸 
  𝑜 ∗
𝜂  𝑥𝑖 
   , 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼   
 
∑ 𝜑  𝑥𝑞 
  𝑥𝑞 
  
   , 𝑞 = 1, … ,𝑄   
 𝜑  , 𝛽    , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛   
The allocation plan can be obtained easily in accordance with the condition of 
efficiency invariance. When the exogenous inputs and outputs are 0, the general 
two-stage structure transforms into a basic two-stage system. 
6. Conclusions and direction for future studies  
Numerous DMUs, such as banks, hospitals, universities or corporations, have 
two-stage network structures. Previous DEA-based models for fixed cost allocation 
usually treat DMUs as a “black box”. In this work, we aim to open the “black box” of 
DMUs and investigate their internal structure. Therefore, we extend Cook and Kress 
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(1999)‟s model to two-stage systems by considering the relationship between two 
subtages of DMUs. We also combine cooperative and noncooperative models with 
Cook and Kress (1999)‟s approach to explore the condition of efficiency invariance. 
The cooperative model applies to the case when two substages work together to 
obtain the best overall system performance. By contrast, the noncooperative model is 
suitable for network systems whose substages compete with each other. This study 
fills in the gap left by previous studies on the model of fixed cost allocation, which 
combines the two-stage system with the gaming concept. 
We prove that when the two stages work together, the overall efficiency of all 
DMUs remain unchanged after fixed cost allocation by using our approach. Moreover, 
when the two stages are noncooperative, we provide an allocation scheme that 
maintains the divisional efficiencies of two stages of all DMUs. It is found that the 
allocation results are related to input size and efficiency. If two DMUs‟ inputs are 
similar, DMU with low efficiency affords more cost than the other because the DMU 
with low efficiency requires more cost to ensure its efficiency invariant when the input 
sizes of two DMUs are the same. Meanwhile, if the efficiency scores of two DMUs are 
similar, DMU with large input affords more cost than another DMU. These results 
indicate that our allocation has a direct relationship with efficiencies and the input 
size of each stage. 
This work can be extended to several directions. First, investigating the fixed cost 
allocation of two-stage systems with cooperative relationships on the basis of the 
principle of divisional efficiency invariance remains interesting and crucial. Next, our 
proposed models are based on the principle of efficiency invariance. Therefore, 
developing an approach that is based on the principle of efficiency maximization to 
solve this problem is critical. Finally, the leader-follower relationship between two 
stages are given and identified based on enough priori knowledge in our 
noncooperative scenario. However, sometimes the leader stages of two-stage systems 
are unknown in the absence of priori knowledge. Extending our approach to this case 
is an important and interesting work in the future.  
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